Contributed Papers
Alphabetical Listing
by Author
Erik Daniel Baldwin, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University,
“On a MacIntyrean Account of Theoretical Rationality”
According
to MacIntyre, distinct traditions of inquiry accept different accounts
of practical and theoretical rationality. On this view, one who is theoretically
rational reasons in accord with a particular tradition of inquiry’s
standards of theoretical rationality. Specifically, one must (at least
implicitly) accept certain belief forming practices and basic sources
of rational and/or justified belief and not others and maintain that
those who add to or subtract from them (probably) do not get at truth
as well. But then it seems that reasonable disagreement between members
of different traditions of inquiry is not possible – members of distinct
traditions of inquiry will that think, generally, non-members get at
truth less well than they do. However, it seems that inter-traditional
disagreements about standards of rationality can be reasonable. And
so it seems that a MacIntyrean account of theoretical rationality is
problematic. But the problem is resolved if we recognize that rationally
aiming at truth and rationally getting at truth are different notions
and that accounts of theoretical rationality require the former notion
but not the latter. Furthermore, if we recognize the distinction between
‘being theoretically rational’ and ‘getting at truth’, we can
see how members of different traditions of inquiry go about getting
at truth reasonably, and we are able to dialogue constructively with
them about which standards of theoretical rationality are true and why.
Thus, rather than making it problematic, a MacIntyrean account of theoretical
rationality makes reasonable, inter-traditional disagreement about standards
of theoretical rationality possible.
Ján Baňas, Department of Philosophy, Catholic University, Slovakia
“Rawls on Liberal Neutrality, Moral Skepticism, and the Good Life”
John
Rawls, in line with the liberal tradition, contends that in modern societies
there exists a plurality of different and often incompatible conceptions
of the good. This pluralism, which is peculiarly modern and labeled
by Rawls as “reasonable”, gives rise to both an epistemic issue
and a political challenge. On the level of moral epistemology, Rawls
seems to hold a skeptical view that it is impossible to determine rationally
which of the conceptions of the good is/are superior, or more adequate
for human beings to reasonably pursue. Pluralism further creates a political
challenge in the task of avoiding civic strife, given the impossibility
of resolving this plurality rationally. In response to this challenge,
Rawls proposes to restrict the introduction of disputes about the good
life in the public/political sphere. His restrictions are aimed at creating
a neutral public discourse that is to ensure that pluralism does not
lead to an unjust imposition of a particular conception of the good
on society and/or social instability. This paper examines the basic
structure of Rawls’ argument concerning the plurality of the conceptions
of the good in his Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Rawls’
reasons for both adopting the restrictions on the debates of the good
life in the public sphere and for advocating in favor of political neutrality
are also analyzed in particular. This paper tries to determine the role
moral skepticism plays in Rawls’ argument and whether it is necessary
for his conception of political neutrality.
Michael Baur, Fordham University,
“Alasdair MacIntyre and the Claims of Natural Law,”
An important question for natural law theorists is the question of the relationship between law and virtue. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that proponents of the new natural law theory have developed a theory of natural law that wrong-headedly divorces Aquinas’s account of natural law from its broader metaphysical, moral, and dialectical context (e.g., see MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 133-135). Conversely, proponents of the new natural law theory have argued that MacIntyre has emphasized the role of practices and virtues to the point of overlooking the priority of “lawfulness” over virtue (e.g., see Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions,” in R. George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays).
In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the dispute between MacIntyre and the proponents of the new natural law (e.g., Grisez, Finnis, Boyle, and George) ought to be resolved in favor of MacIntyre. At the heart of my demonstration is the notion of “the common good,” which is sometimes under-emphasized in the work of Macintyrean philosophers, and almost always overlooked or misunderstood in the work of the new natural law theorists. My demonstration will depend on the explication of a handful of key claims made by Thomas Aquinas regarding the notion of law and the common good. Aquinas holds:
all law (including the natural law) aims primarily at the common good of a community, and not merely at individual goods;the common good of a community is more desirable than the proper good of any individual community member, not on account of any utilitarian considerations, but on account of the fact that the individual’s own proper good is achieved more perfectly only within the community of which he or she is a part;
when a law-giver legislates for the sake of the common good of a community, that which is required by law is not merely imposed externally on members of the community, but rather becomes an internal principle of actions which are properly attributable to individual members of the community as their own actions.
In keeping with Aquinas’s thought, MacIntyre argues that the primary function of human law is to educate and to promote virtue in those who are subject to it. Furthermore, MacIntyre holds that such education and virtue-building are not contrary to, but are in fact perfective of, the rational capacities of individuals qua individuals. And so contrary to the claims of some new natural law theorists, a proper understanding of human law and of the natural law depends on a proper understanding of the virtues and the common good.
In
defending MacIntyre against the criticisms of the new natural law theorists,
I aim not only to demonstrate the deep kinship between MacIntyre and
Thomas Aquinas on the common good natural law, and virtue. I aim
also to shed light on the meaning of some of MacIntyre’s more striking
statements about the communal character of human thought and action
(e.g., MacIntyre’s statement that “The concept of good . . . has
application only for beings insofar as they are members of some species
or kind….” Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 134).
Greg Beabout, St. Louis University,
“Would the New St. Benedict Need a Manager? From Weberian Bureaucrat to Wise Steward,”
In the well-known concluding line to After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that we await another St. Benedict. To sustain the tradition of the virtues amidst a situation where the barbarians "have already been governing us for quite some time," MacIntyre calls for a new – doubtless very different – Benedict.
Earlier in After Virtue, MacIntyre identifies three contemporary characters who embody emotivism. Chief among these is the manager, a Weberian bureaucrat who uses rationality as an instrument to devise efficient means to achieve a proposed end. As such, the manager is unconcerned with internal goods, social practices, tradition, and the virtues that are integral to pursuing such goods. In short, for the manager so conceived, profit trumps virtue.
I take it as given that this sort of manager is undesirable. However, I want to question MacIntyre's assumption that we can form communities of virtue without managers. That seems false. In order to live in communities, we need some member (or members) of the community to take on the roles of planning, organizing, leading, monitoring, and correcting. These are the tasks of the manager. Rather than seeking to eliminate the manager, I propose that we should try to reconceive the character of the manager.
Michael Novak, in The Fire of Invention, has suggested that the economic planning, organization, and leadership that are integral to the modern market economy has its historical roots in the monasteries founded by St. Benedict. Benedict's Rule provided for a way of life that promoted economic sustainability, enabling entire regions to move beyond subsistence living.
Novak and MacIntyre, it seems to me, have each given us a partial account of the manager. Novak seems to suggest that the Benedictine monastery, as a corporate body producing wine and cheese, seamlessly unfolded into the modern business corporation. In contrast, MacIntyre describes the manager as bureaucrat and seems to suggest that if we eliminate the Weberian bureaucrat through a retrieval of the life of virtue, we will have communities of virtue with no need for managers.
Between these two, I propose that the role of the manager is integral to living together in communities and engaging in corporate acts. In order to promote communities of virtue, we need a way to conceive of the manager as something other than the Weberian bureaucrat. In short, I propose that, even if we follow MacIntyre's suggestion to cultivate new forms of local community in which we can practice the virtues, such corporate bodies will need leaders who plan, organize, monitor and correct.
The
Rule of St. Benedict characterizes the abbot as a person of practical
wisdom who acts as a steward of the community and its resources.
How might the abbot be a model for the manager? What is the character
of such a manager? What is the nature of practical reason that
would be embodied in that kind of manager? What might Benedict's
description of the character traits of the abbot teach us about how
we might transform our conception of the manager? To answer these
questions, I draw from Benedict's Rule to reflect on what it would be
to manage as a wise steward.
Ron Beadle, Northumbria University, UK,
“‘From each according to his ability …’ Rationality and Capability in the Practice Based Community,”
What are the implications of differential capability for the types of relationship which should pertain within a practice-based community and for leading a good life?
Whilst in Dependent Rational Animals (1999) MacIntyre considers the implications of and virtuous responses to radically differentiated human capabilities, this paper considers the implications of less radically differentiated but nevertheless consistently observable differences between individuals’ capabilities within and across practices.
At the level of individual practices it appears straightforward to suggest that relative contributions made towards the work of the practice would differ where practitioners of different capability levels work with similar levels of commitment to the practice and observation of its norms. But what if any are the implications of this for the decision making structures of practice-embodying institutions, for practice-based communities and for our notion of human flourishing?
In considering this issue we will use the work of the psychologist Elliott Jaques on general capability (Jaques 1976, 1986 Jaques and Cason 1994). Jaques’s research demonstrates marked differences in the complexity of mental processing of which human beings are capable and he concludes from this and related studies that hierarchy is a necessary and virtuous response to this differentiation.
Whilst the specific content of Jaques’s concept of complexity of mental processing bears more relation to what might traditionally be taken as formal rather than substantive rationality the distinction between them becomes precarious inasmuch as formal rationality always has some content. It may follow from this that an Aristotelian interpretation of Jaques would hold that rationality is itself highly differentiated between individuals.
Whatever
the merits of Jaques’s own position, the issue of capability considerations
in the normal range has a number of implications for a MacIntyrean.
This paper will consider two sets of potential implications, first for
the management of practice embodying communities (we will consider the
idea of the foundation of a MacIntyrean academic journal as an example)
and second for our understanding of human flourishing.
Ron Beadle, Northumbria University, UK,
Contribution to Panel Discussion on MacIntyrean
Empirics
Caleb Bernacchio and Philip de Mahy, Louisiana State University
“The Separation of Theory from Practice in the Heideggerian Aristotle of Arendt and Strauss”
The
paper, which I am writing with Philip de Mahy, develops Dr. Knight's
comments on Strauss, in his recent book, Aristotelian Philosophy.
In order to critique Strauss's political thought and to demonstrate
Strauss's conservative relativism and emotivism we will focus on his
use of Heidegger's Aristotle. We intend to show that Heidegger's
Aristotle, which influenced Strauss, Arendt and Gadamer, leads to a
separation of theory from practice. In this approach ethics and
politics are independent from metaphysical issues and ultimately are
not rationally justifiable. We will show that Strauss's approach
fails for the same reasons as did the views critiqued in the beginning
of After Virtue. We will then contrast Strauss's Heideggerian
Aristotle with Macintyre's Thomist Aristotle.
Andrius Bielskis, ISM University of Management and Economics ,Vilnius, Lithuania,
“MacIntyre and Marx: Labour and Practice against Capital and Institutions,”
It
has been argued many times that intellectual and political Left, especially
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been in crisis. Anthony
Giddens, Slavoj Žižek, Steven Lukes, to name but a few, argued that
the Left not only lost its identity but also ceased to play any important
role in its political struggle to replace the socioeconomic system of
market capitalism. The demise of Marxism, especially after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, contributed significantly to the crisis of the
Left. Alasdair MacIntyre rejected Marxism as early as 1968, but he never
rejected Marx’s critique of the capitalist social order. In this paper
I want to explore some of the reasons why MacIntyre rejected Marxism,
as well as whether, and if so how, his post-Marxist ethical theory can
be utilized in reviving the intellectual and political Left. I will
argue that Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral and political philosophy can
provide us with intellectual and moral resources to revive a New Left
which, of course, would be very different from the New Left of 1960s
and 1970s. Karl Marx’s fundamental distinction between labour and
capital, enabling the organized labour movement to resist capital’s
irrational effort constantly to increase itself, is no longer or/and
not sufficient. Thus the labour and capital should be understood in
the light of Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between practices and
intuitions: labour can be reinterpreted in terms of practice while the
capital is the network of institutions which, if unchecked, will always
subvert the moral character of labour.
Carrie-Ann Biondi, Dept. of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marymount Manhattan College,
“Aristotle, Liberalism, and the Common Advantage,”
Alasdair
MacIntyre famously draws on Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition
as part of his project of providing an alternative to what he rightfully
sees as the typical moral bankruptcy or confusion of liberalism.
However, I maintain that MacIntyre is mistaken to think that Aristotelianism
and liberalism are at odds with one another. Rather, liberal political
theorists—as some of them are beginning to realize—have much to
learn from Aristotle, especially about the common advantage. A
rationally grounded view of the good life along Aristotelian lines actually
can support a liberal individualist conception of the common advantage
as the maintenance of liberty, properly understood.
Christopher Caldwell, Dept. of History and Philosophy, Virginia State University,
“The Social Requirement and Human Perfection: Alfarabi and MacIntyre,”
In
“The Attainment of Happiness”, Alfarabi, the tenth-century Islamic
thinker, utilizes a social notion of the perfection of man which requires
that one associate with others. The discussion predicts MacIntyre’s
notion of tradition. However, MacIntyre's view of tradition can
accommodate this view of perfection, and be enhanced by the social notion
and Alfarabi’s surrounding discussion of philosophy and the virtues.
The paper explores the incorporation of Alfarabi’s insights concerning
perfection into a MacIntyrean system. The adequacy of the inclusion
of such a social component as a necessary condition for perfection and
the virtuous life is endorsed.
Delilah Caldwell, Virginia State University,
“A New Route to Virtue: Dialogue and Character Evaluation”
MacIntyre
resuscitates the virtue tradition in philosophy, arguing that a return
to the moral evaluation of character within a context in which virtue
is taught can restore important traits to contemporary society. I argue
that contemporary society, with a predominance of social interactions
among persons who do not know one another well, requires a more nuanced
method for evaluating character than the assignment of virtues as was
done in heroic societies. Instead, contemporary moral evaluations of
character require the establishment, via dialogue, of objective standards.
The resulting moral system is a pluralistic virtue ethics requiring
ongoing discussion of virtue.
Samantha Coe, Northumbria University, England, “Attempting MacIntyrean Empirics – A report from The Sage Gateshead,”
As
part of the ongoing attempts to conduct MacIntyrean empirics this paper
presents initial findings from a research project using MacIntyre’s
(1981) goods-virtues-practice-
Using interviews with four of the founders of this music facility, it considers the extent to which theirs was a meaningful project aiming to achieve common goods and pursue a just purpose.
While questions of research design, method
and ethics are to be considered elsewhere in this conference, this paper
will also consider Blackman and Connelly’s (2001) critical perspective
on learning histories and in particular the generation of historical
knowledge for the purpose of an organisation’s self-understanding.
Samantha Coe, Northumbria University, UK
Contribution to Panel Discussion on MacIntyrean
Empirics
Carter Crockett, Westmont College, California, US
Contribution to Panel Discussion on MacIntyrean
Empirics
Bryan R. Cross, Saint Louis University,
"In Principle Commensurability, Implicit Rationality, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition".
One
not uncommon way of understanding Alasdair MacIntyre's position regarding
the tradition-constituted nature of rationality is that there is no
neutral rationality that can adjudicate between the rival claims of
competing traditions. This idea is used by some to defend the claim
that appeals to objective rationality mask a form of manipulation and
control. Undoubtedly that is often true. But the worry for realists,
including Thomistic realists, is that tradition-constituted rationality
is or implies a form of relativism, a conclusion which MacIntyre himself
rejects. For MacIntyre, all conflicts between rival and as yet incommensurable
traditions are in principle surmountable. In this paper I argue that
this in principle non-fideistic surmmountability implies an in principle
underlying or implicit commensurability of traditions, which itself
depends upon an implicit rationality in all traditions. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic
tradition, this implicit rationality is explained by a shared human
nature and a common human experience of the world. It is to this common
human experience that we can appeal, in principle, on the basis of our
shared human nature, in order to adjudicate rationally between competing
traditions. In this way, rationality as tradition-constitutive constrains
rationality as tradition-constituted, grounding the in principle though
implicit commensurability of as yet incommensurable traditions.
Neil Davidson, University of Strathclyde
“Alasdair MacIntyre in 1968: The Road
from Marxism?”
Neil Davidson, University of Strathclyde
Contribution to Panel Discussion on Labor
and Unionization
Barry DeCoster, Vassar College,
‘Medicine, Patients, and Practice: Constructing New Traditions for Being a "Good Patient"’
In this paper, I take up MacIntyre's concept of a “practice” to articulate the role of the “good patient”. Over the last century, the goals and moral responsibilities for patients have changed greatly. Modern patients—in light of bioethics’ success—benefit from greater autonomy, richer access to information, and broader control regarding their own health. It is surprising, though, that only limited critical accounts of what it means to be a “good patient” have been produced. Although the term “problem patient” is frequently tossed about, there is little by way of corrective provided, or detailed moral analysis of such individuals.
Patients are taught to be patients through a variety of social processes, which have identifiable internal goods. Here the topic of patients’ involvement in a practice is interesting in a number of ways. First, patients are actively developing new activities, internal goods, and traditions, many in contradiction to previous traditions regarding being a good patient (e.g., patients’ traditional deferment to clinicians’ judgments). Second, as patients redefine their practices, it has important implications on the larger practice of medicine. This also raises questions about how practices (and possible sub-practices) of medicine, science, and clinical care are interrelated to patients’ well-being.
I
identify a number of internal goods that correspond to patients’ successful
involvement in their healthcare decisions. Patients enact a number of
traditional virtues—courage, wisdom, honesty—but they also enact
a set of newly emerging virtues. These new roles allow patients greater
input, but they also create new responsibilities as we continue to refine
the practice of being a patient.
Philip de Mahy and Caleb Bernacchio, Louisiana State University
“Heidegger’s Aristotle and Separation of Theory from Practice,”
See above, at “Caleb Bernacchio and
Philip DeMahy.”
Daniel Farmer, Marquette University,
“Feminism and the Good”
Many feminists are wary of MacIntyre’s claim that moral inquiry is rational to the extent that it belongs to a tradition which shares a particular conception of the human good. The concern here is that traditioned moral reasoning may be incapable of attaining the necessary ‘critical distance’ for feminists to do their thing. What if, as Susan Moller Okin suggests, “there is something fundamentally incoherent about the traditions themselves?” Must we not “look elsewhere for answers to questions about justice and rationality?” (Justice, Gender, and the Family, Basic Books, 1989, p. 60)
This concern is best addressed by noticing that that ‘thing’ feminists do—namely name and critique gender bias in its covert and structural forms—is done from a variety of often incompatible perspectives. Feminist analyses of the philosophical ‘canon’ of the Western philosophical tradition, for example, are done with an eye to what theories are ‘useful’ to ‘the feminist project’, or feminist aims more generally. But this pragmatic appropriation (and rejection) of various ethical lenses betrays wildly different (and incommensurable) conceptions of the ‘oppression’ feminists by definition aim to end.
If
important theoretical work in feminist revisions of the canon is done
by implicit and thus unexamined views of the good (including, e.g.,
what ‘non-oppression’ consists in), this might explain why contemporary
feminisms seem relatively powerless. In MacIntyrean terms, positive
feminist proposals can only be rationally evaluated when their conceptions
of the human good are made explicit. Something like MacIntyre’s concept
of a tradition of moral inquiry then becomes precisely what feminists
need to make their claims credible. Lest they become merely one more
voice in the cacophony of contemporary moral discourse, feminists would
do well to see MacIntyre as friend rather than foe.
Leonard D. G. Ferry, Department of Political Science, University Of Toronto
“Do Nonhuman Animals Have Reasons for Action?”
MacIntyre
poses and affirmatively answers a question similar to this in his
Dependent Rational Animals. In the relevant chapter he takes
aim at both analytical philosophers, like McDowell, and those in the
continental tradition. But he turns to Aquinas as source of the
resources needed to combat the negative answers he sees as plaguing
these competing philosophical traditions. In this paper I too
pose the above question, but, like Kenny, find reason to assert a negative
answer. In the first part of the paper I draw upon several texts
in Aquinas (both from the Summa and from some of the commentaries
on Aristotle) to suggest that the tenor of Aquinas? claims about animal
prudence is always far more guarded than MacIntyre suggests. In
the second part I attempt to make the critique from the internal point
of view by suggesting that MacIntyre?s understanding of the natural
law tradition and of prudence cannot support the defense of animal reasons
for action.
Milton Fisk, Indiana University
Contribution to Panel Discussion on Labor
and Unionization
Fiona Grooms, St. Louis University,
“Theory, Practice, and Tradition: Human Rationality in Pursuit of the Good Life,”
“Tradition…cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour.” –T.S. Eliot “Tradition and Individual Talent”
Taken as a collection of practices such as folding hands during prayer, waiting to eat until the hostess has lifted her fork, bowing to superiors, and fasting on Good Friday, tradition is inherited with little or no effort. By nature, humans are habit-acquiring creatures. Having acquired the habits of a tradition, we thereby embody the tradition by living it.
In
this paper, I propose that while the embodiment of a tradition in human
habits is essential to the life of that tradition, the tradition will
fail if the reasons for the practices are forgotten. The perfect inheritance
of a tradition requires that the science of the tradition – the knowledge
of the causes for the practices – be passed on and elaborated upon.
As both St Thomas and Aristotle maintain, while the man of experience
(the one who embodies the tradition by living out its practices) is
of great value to society, he cannot answer questions as to why he does
what he does. In the face of skeptics or simply of inquiring children,
only the man of science may give satisfaction by teaching the causes.
When the only answer available to the one who questions tradition is
that ‘its always been done this way’, the tradition is in peril.
Remembering and understanding why we engage in various practices is
the ‘great labour’ of inheritance.
Raymond Hain, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
“Good Counsel and the Social Character of the Virtues”
While
exercise of the moral virtues is frequently understood as a social activity,
this is less often the case for the intellectual virtues. Here I will
consider one particular intellectual virtue, good counsel, and the role
it plays in practical reasoning for Aristotle and Aquinas. For both,
this virtue is part of prudence and therefore governs our conception
of what we ought to do. If possession of good counsel is most properly
a result of social interaction, as Alasdair MacIntyre gives us reason
to think, then on the one hand, if in order to pursue our good we require
the counsel of others, our relationships with those others must be characterized
by the virtues if we are to succeed in counseling and being counseled.
But on the other hand, while the need for counsel suggests we have good
reason to act virtuously towards others, counsel itself informs our
understanding of what we ought to do, and therefore to the extent that
we participate in inadequate counsel due to the absence of the virtues
we will in turn fail to see the role that virtue plays for counsel in
the achievement of our good; our conception of counsel itself and its
connection to our pursuit of the good is a result of counsel, and so
dependent on the sorts of relationships we have with others. And therefore
we have reason to think that moral conversion will be primarily a result
of virtuous relationships rather than theoretical argument.
Paul F. Jeffries, Department of Philosophy, Ripon College,
“The Practice of ‘Loving One’s Enemies’: Pursuing Truth as a Transcultural Practice”
The tradition-based mode of moral and philosophical enquiry defended by Alasdair MacIntyre manifests a deep commitment to a conception of truth that is both universal and yet tradition-bound. Critics frequently point to this apparent contradiction as a reason for rejecting a tradition-based mode of enquiry. Such criticisms fail to fully appreciate the philosophical resources that can be brought to bear to vindicate a tradition-bound theory of truth.
In this paper, I first examine MacIntyre’s account of the practice of painting from his essay, “Colors, Cultures, and Practices,” as a means of demonstrating how practices can be transcultural. Central to his account is the way in which one can assess the truthfulness and superiority rival practices of painting both within and across cultures.
Building on these insights, I then examine the way in which rival traditions implicitly if not explicitly engage in the pursuit of truth though their various practices. In several important respects, this pursuit of the truth can be understood as a kind of transcultural practice.
Finally,
I will develop an account, based on fundamental insights from MacIntyre’s
tradition-based mode of enquiry, of several practices that are vital
to the transcultural practice of pursuing truth. Central among
these practices is the need to deeply appreciate one’s philosophical
rivals. Only through engaging with one’s rivals can one hope
to vindicate one’s claims to truth.
Robert Johansen, Diocese of Kalamazoo, Michigan
"The Subjectivized Liturgy and the Good Life".
Josef Pieper, in Leisure: The Basis of Culture, demonstrates that leisure, which Aristotle posited was necessary for the “good life”, is only properly ordered when it has its origin in the cultus, that is, public worship. In Catholic doctrine, the pre-eminent, and indeed, the most perfect form of worship is the Liturgy of the Mass. The Mass, in Catholic theology, is ordered to the contemplation of God, and therefore, in Aristotelian terms, participation in the Mass should be
considered as a necessary element of the good life.
However,
since the Second Vatican Council, certain attitudes and understandings
of Liturgy which Pope Benedict has characterized as “deformations”
have obscured its nature and purpose. These deformations are, in fact,
primarily ideological, and indeed spring from ideologies that are anithetical
to the Christian understanding of the human person. MacIntyre's
analysis of Emotivism and the breakdown of objective categories of meaning,
and his discussion of the telos of human life in After Virtue provide
valuable tools for understanding this problem, and offer broader cultural
implications as well.
Liam Kavanagh, Villanova University
“MacIntyre and Foucault on Social Control”
In
this paper I argue for a MacIntyrean critique of the theory of social
control. While contemporary philosophical and sociological accounts
abound with theories of bio-power and normative models of control and
domination, MacIntyre proposes two key arguments to undermine the relationship
between these theories and the actual practice of social organization.
Given that all forms of organization presuppose an element of unpredictability
- and require the ability to respond to unpredictable circumstances
– the very attempt to efface all unpredictability in the name of complete
control undermines itself from the outset. Secondly, the alleged reality
of social control is itself an illusion. Rather than the implementation
of a master ratio, the appearance of social control is more often than
not an expression of impotence: desperate ad hoc responses to changing
circumstances. Contrasting MacIntyre’s position to that of Michel
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, I argue that the real threat of
social control comes not from its allegedly ubiquitous and normative
power, but rather, from its sheer sense of desperation and lack of rationality;
a state of affairs which can only be overcome by reinscribing all forms
of social organization within a tradition of the virtues and practical
rationality.
Ashleen Menchaca Kelly, Trinity University,
“Alasdair MacIntyre: Prophet and Missionary,”
How
does a person respectively adopt the traditions of Marxist Christianity,
an atheistic nontraditional form of analytic philosophy and orthodox,
Roman Catholic Thomism within the course of 50 years? This paper examines
the continued development of themes and concerns in MacIntyre’s philosophy,
in addition to the particular demands and implications of Thomistic
Aristotelianism as addressed in the strategy and construction of his
later work. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that in the context of his
intellectual history, MacIntyre’s acceptance of Thomism is less surprising
than it at first seems. Taking this holistic and contextual account
even further, some of his most significant philosophical contributions
actually translate his personal experience of philosophical conversion
into a form of Thomistic Aristotelianism that is specially tailored
to the conditions of contemporary society. For MacIntyre, no separation
exists between the disquiet and suffering of his intellectual journey,
the crisis of contemporary moral philosophy, and the ordinary lives
of men and women. It is his personal relationship with the divine that
drives his work since his conversion, yet it is a hallmark of his missionary
ethic that Christ is conspicuously absent from his theories. This is
because MacIntyre’s personal discovery of faith relied upon notably
secular concepts and dialectic with the contemporary world, which he
in turn models in his work since After Virtue. I contend that it is
therefore his hope to establish an environment for that same sort of
discovery on a massive scale. He relies on the operation of “grace”
to accomplish what his theoretical framework merely sets the stage for:
the conversion of the culture of advanced modernity.
Irfan Khawaja, Dept. of Philosophy, Felician College,
“MacIntyre on Epistemic First Principles: A Critique,”
In
his 1990 Aquinas Lecture First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary
Philosophical Issues, Alasdair MacIntyre argues in favor of Aristotelian-Thomist
first principles but argues against what he calls 'epistemological first
principles'. To this end, he rejects the 'first person perspective'
that he takes to be characteristic of the epistemic enterprise, and
argues against the very possibility of regress-stoppers as conceived
of by epistemic foundationalism. Contrary to MacIntyre, I argue that
'the faithful Aristotelian' can in fact engage 'in an epistemological
enterprise' (p. 11). In particular, I suggest that MacIntyre underestimates
the resources available to an Aristotelian form of epistemic foundationalism
that combines direct realism about perception (cf. De Anima II.6-III.2)
with a modest internalism about epistemic justification (cf. Posterior
Analytics I.3).
Kelvin Knight
Three Rival Versions of Political and Social Enquiry: Republicanism,
Liberalism, and Aristotelianism
This paper contrasts MacIntyre's sociologically revised Aristotelianism with two rivals. One is the tradition of republicanism, as revived by the historians J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. The other is F.A. Hayek's liberal tradition. MacIntyre's position has always been opposed to liberalism, but once resembled republicanism. The paper argues that republicanism, having been defeated in the eighteenth century by
liberals' case for commerce, remains theoretically defenceless against liberalism. Therefore, the rivalry reduces to that between liberalism and Aristotelianism. The crux of this rivalry is between
Aristotelianism's locally causal connection of intentions, actions and consequences and, conversely, liberalism's theorization of an extended order that is independent of individual intentionality and, therefore, independent of the virtues. MacIntyre offers a critique of that
capitalist order, couched in terms of virtues, practices and
institutions, together with a proposition that Aristotelians retreat
for some serious practical reasoning to somewhere like St. Meinrad.
Marian Kuna, Department of Philosophy, Catholic University, Slovakia,
“Conservative and Radical – Alasdair MacIntyre’s Political Theory of Thomistic Aristotelianism”
MacIntyre has not only seriously challenged distinctively modern individualism and nation-state along with their respective ideologies of liberalism and free-market capitalism, but proposed his own alternative to these. His alternative framed in terms of the politics of a practice-based participatory local community of the common good may be perceived both as conservative and radical at the same time. Its conservative character stems from his commitment to a distinctively Aristotelian-Thomist political morality – expressed in the claim that the human condition is to be understood as requiring both the virtues of acknowledged dependence and those of rational independence. However, his categorical rejection of modern political and economic realties may seem far too radical.
Surprisingly
enough, it is a version of Aristotelianism and more recently that of
Thomism that inform MacIntyre’s radicalism. This way he has shown
both Aristotle and Aquinas as a sources of political theory that is
conservative on the one hand, but can serve as a basis for radical political
practice on the other. This paper attempts to present these various
strands of MacIntyre’s approach and to critically evaluate its conservative
and radical implications.
Christopher Lutz, Saint Meinrad School of Theology,
“Tradition as a Fragile Practice: Nominalism, Grace, and the Reformation,”
This
paper presents some of my ongoing work on the rise of Nominalism and
Voluntarism in second millennium Western Christian thought, and its
consequences for modernity and post-modernity. The paper takes
up After Virtue’s suggestion that we need a more sufficient account
of the history of late medieval philosophy, particularly with respect
to the rejection of Aristotelian teleology and turn to voluntarism in
ethics. I propose that both the Thomistic synthesis of Aristotelian
natural philosophy with the Augustinian Neo-Platonic tradition and the
Nominalist movement associated with William of Ockham should be viewed
as outcomes of the Western Christian encounter with Islam. Where
the Thomistic response to Islam emphasized metaphysical realism in keeping
with traditional Neo-Platonism, the Nominalist response found something
compelling in the Muslim emphasis on the freedom and sovereignty of
God. I present Heiko Oberman’s account of the efforts of early
Nominalists to emphasize divine sovereignty while avoiding theological
determinism, and show that to accomplish their purpose the Nominalists
redefined the doctrine of Grace. I suggest that the position taken
by Luther, Calvin, and Jansen in the sixteenth century was the outcome
of importing Augustine’s doctrine of grace into the Nominalist framework.
The paper will conclude by considering the lessons this offers for a
MacIntyrean approach to the history of philosophy. Traditions
are practices and they are fragile.
Piotr Machura, Institute of Philosophy, University of Silesia,
“Community and self-perfection: MacIntyre and the case of demos,”
One of the conflicts that shape western democracy is that between the idea of a shared political culture which enables community members to form demos, and the liberal idea of elections in which most of the people are nothing but a (intellectually passive) purchasers of a political ‘product’. This conflict marks the fundamental distortion of a modern politics: it is no longer rooted in the shared believes and skills thanks to which everyone can become a genuine subject of politics.
But if it is true, what can be done?
If we are to reclaim political subjecthood, it is not sufficient just
to attribute it formally to every single man. For what modern selves
lack is not only shared political agenda but also certain political
competences. It does not follow that politics should be conceived as
an professional activity, but rather it should be a practice in a sense
of MacIntyre. But if it is to be a practice both moral and intellectual
skills must be sustained within it. Hence the idea of political perfectionism:
one cannot be genuine member of a demos if he or she is not able to
meet certain moral and intellectual requirements. Hence philosophy,
as both Aristotle and MacIntyre claim, should be a conceived as way
of learning both political and intellectual virtues, and as a mode of
achieving human perfection. And moral, intellectual and political agency
cannot be understand separately.
Sante Maletta, University of Calabria, Cosenza, Italy,
“How can we resist evil? Practical rationality and the virtues”
In
his works MacIntyre focuses on the compartmentalization of social roles
peculiar to liberalism, which produces a divided and irresponsible subject.
In this way MacIntyre opens up the possibility of a new interesting
interpretative perspective on contemporary history, characterized by
a widespread impotence to resist evil. To do this we need two virtues
─ constancy and integrity ─ which rise and develop through the exercise
of practical discourse, which never stops to ask questions about the
order of the goods within a community of research. This theoretical
perspective requires an intelligent revival of the tradition of the
natural law understood as a rational law ─ i.e. as a law that enjoins
the achievement of the human good as the good of the reason, for the
reason and formulated by the reason.
Damon Martin, University of Dayton,
“MacIntyre, Metaphysical Biology, and
the Human Good: What Science Can Tell Us about Living the Good Life,”
Evelyn Mazzucco, independent scholar
“Origins of Relativism,”
According
to MacIntyre in, "Whose Justice? Which Rationality?",the anti-Aristotelian
modes of theorizing began first in the sciences at the time of the Scottish
Enlightenment. This paper proposes two additional reasons for the acceptance
of these anti-Aristotelian modes; the belief in the truth of scientific
theories brought about by the work of such scientists as Galileo and
Copernicus and the fragmentation of the truths of Christianity brought
about by the Protestant Reformation. These led to the seeking of absolute
truth in empiricism rather than in the infallible teachings of the Church
with the result that finally it was deemed necessary to abandon the
search.
Peter McMylor,University of Manchester
“The Human Sciences as Moral Sciences? The resources of MacIntyrean Realism for Sociology”
During
the initial period of their formation it had long been conventional
to refer to the social sciences as moral sciences. However, in practice
the impact of varieties of positivism and forms of implicit relativism
have meant that the moral dimensions of social actions have been
viewed as simply ‘social facts’, of ‘local’ behaviour. This
paper will argue that MacIntyre’s mature work provides the resources
for a profound philosophical anthropology that can allow the restoration
of the crucial evaluative dimension to the human sciences without being
blind to context and particularity.
David McPherson, Marquette University
“MacIntyre on the Role of Authority in Moral Enquiry,”
In
this essay I would like to examine the role of authority in moral education
and rational moral enquiry in the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, especially
in his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. MacIntyre claims that
we can only rationally enquire into our good by first accepting the
guidance of certain authorities within communal practices and traditions,
because rational moral enquiry, far from being independent of social
and historical circumstance, can not but be dependent upon them. Because
such a claim is likely to arouse much suspicion in our post-Enlightenment
culture, in large part my task will be to show how the various forms
of authority within MacIntyre’s account of tradition-dependent moral
enquiry come to be established as rationally legitimate (something which
he often leaves implicit) insofar as they enable us to become self-moved
participants within a communal practice of moral enquiry. However, in
final analysis I would also like to consider how this account fits with
MacIntyre acceptance of the Thomistic theory of natural law which claims
that there a certain basic moral truths we all know, or at least have
the potentiality to know. I will argue that this claim itself must defended
on the basis of a tradition-dependent form of moral enquiry, though
I also believe that it requires MacIntyre to revise some of his pessimism
regarding the state of contemporary moral discourse.
Nathan Metzger, City University of New York, “MacIntyrean Naturalism and the Metaethics of “Crunchy” Conservatism,”
My
paper aspires to address issues pertinent to debates in metaethics and
popular politics both. On a theoretical level, I shall explain why MacIntyre’s
own version of naturalism provides a cogent critique and alternative
to competing ‘naturalistic’ moral theories (so-called) predominant
in the current literature of metaethics. Ultimately, MacIntyre’s metaphysical,
sociological, and psychological insights help to clarify just what is
at stake in the debate over the nature of ‘nature’, and why the
concept of naturalism has been unduly hijacked so as to alienate moral
theorists otherwise sympathetic to more ‘robust’ conceptions of
the human person in metaethical conservations. But in this way
MacIntyre can also be seen as providing commentary to ‘traditionalist’
political philosophies that also aim for fidelity to nature--especially
those of Wenell Berry and Russell Kirk--which is why the current popular
movement called ‘crunchy conservatism’ can see in MacIntyre a ‘founding
father’ precisely in his endorsement of naturalism. Therefore, MacIntyre’s
insights into the nature of nature pull double duty, and might be the
first instance of a metaethical theory carrying real-world significance.
MacIntyrean naturalism helps clarify what exactly is so odd about both
philosophical naturalism (so-called) and the current ‘conservative’
and ‘liberal’ political demarcation in popular politics. Proponents
of the MacIntyrean naturalistic viewpoint (knowingly or not) find themselves—politically
and philosophically—in a camp all their own.
Geoff Moore, Durham Business School, Durham University,
“Developing MacIntyre’s Framework: Exploring Virtue in Organizations,”
Over
a period of time a conceptual framework has been constructed based on
Alasdair MacIntyre’s schema of virtues-goods-practices-
However, this work currently lacks empirical support and so, in line with a movement generally towards ‘doing empirics’ with MacIntyre (a special issue of Philosophy of Management, due out in mid-2008, will address precisely this area, for example), this paper explores the early stages of two empirical projects.
The first of these projects is within the remit of the Dept. of Theology and Religion at Durham University and is entitled “Receptive Ecumenism and the Local Church: a regional comparative research project”. This involves co-ordinating a team of practitioners and researchers exploring the similarities and differences between the mission, strategy, governance and resource allocation methods of seven churches (Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, United Reform, Salvation Army and, potentially, new churches) in the north east of England. It is anticipated that, with some additional research by way of interviews and observation, this project will allow an interesting and unusual perspective on MacIntyre’s concepts of practice and institution. For example, one of the areas under consideration is the way in which the different churches conduct the Eucharist, as part of the practice of faith. The degree of institutionalisation associated with the different churches would be expected to have a direct effect on this part of the practice, so the empirical question is the extent to which this is the case.
The second project, at the other end of the spectrum of organisations, is with Alliance Boots, the firm which recently became the subject of the U.K.’s largest ever private equity buy-out. An opportunity has arisen for access to documentation and to personnel associated with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) throughout the firm. This will allow the exploration of a number of aspects of MacIntyre’s conceptual framework, some similar to the “Receptive Ecumenism” project and some quite different. For example, since Boots has been through two considerable changes in the very recent past (the merger with Alliance Unichem and then the private equity takeover) these ‘mode of institutionalisation’ changes might be expected to have had significant effects on the practice at the core of the firm and the extent to which external goods are prioritised. At the same time Alliance Boots is the first private equity firm to commit itself to continuing with its extensive CSR programme. The empirical research should shed some light on the various mechanisms involved in these goods-practice-institution issues.
The
paper will briefly introduce the conceptual framework, discuss some
of the methodological issues associated with conducting empirical work
in this area and introduce the two projects. While there are likely
to be only initial empirical findings to report at this stage, some
of the areas which the research may shed light on (as above) will be
explored.
Geoff Moore, Durham University, England)
Contribution to Panel Discussion on MacIntyrean
Empirics
Jeffery Nicholas, Mt. Angel Seminary,
Biology and Human Ends:A Prolegomena to a Philosophical Anthropology
This paper examines reasons why MacIntyre rejected Aristotle’s metaphysical biology in AV, then examines his recent embrace of a metaphysics and biology to undergird virtue theory. It also examines MacIntyre’s attempts at a biological grounding of virtue theory in DPR and “What is a human body?” While the work is a step in the right direction, it needs development. In particular, it needs a broader perspective on the human person. I then outline a brief philosophical anthropology. we are (1) living (2) animal bodies (3) thrown into a spatio-temporal matrix, (4) in which we live in relationships of dependence and independence with others, (5) seeking self-definition. These aspects of human nature can be found in engagement with practices. Through engagement with a variety of practices, human beings are able expand their powers, abilities, and organs. Finally, I provide some tentative answer to Stout’s objection to a metaphysical biology by suggesting that it is just such a philosophical anthropology we need to answer some of the most difficult and troubling social and spiritual issues of the day.
Jake Noland, Virginia Commonwealth University,
“MacIntyre on Ideology, Reason, and Particularity,”
There is a fatal flaw in Marx’s philosophy
of history, a flaw intrinsic to any theory claiming to identify ideology
and/or social structures as causally determinative. Drawing on MacIntyre’s
work on ideology, I expose this incoherent conception of reason intrinsic
to any Marxian version of history, then build on MacIntyre’s conceptions
of narrative and practice to show that the exercise of reason is neither
obscured nor distorted by particularity, but rather made possible by
it. This, in turn, provides for an account of history that recognizes
social structures and practices as significant factors while still holding
to a libertarian view of human agency.
Michael J. O’Neill, Providence College,
“An ‘Argumentative Ally’: MacIntyre and Collingwood on Defining the Good”
What does MacIntyre mean when he says
that Collingwood is one of his few “argumentative allies” in After
Virtue? This claim might be interpreted as a suggestion that Collingwood
would support MacIntyre’s use of the conception of the narrative self
and narrative knowledge to articulate the moral life when in fact Collingwood
says very little about the use of narrative history. I argue that
MacIntyre is alluding to a deeper methodological similarity. MacIntyre’s
use of philosophical history in After Virtue to define philosophical
concepts is very much in accord with R.G. Collingwood’s philosophical
method in Idea of Nature, Idea of History and Essay on Philosophical
Method. By showing how a concept develops historically,
the possibilities within that concept are revealed and the logical or
structural presentation of a concept becomes possible in a way not available
to any particular historical perspective. As an example, I examine
Collingwood and MacIntyre’s treatment of the concept of the “good”.
Thomas D. Pearson, Department of History & Philosophy The University of Texas-Pan American, “What Good Are Internal Goods? The Relationship Of Goods And Virtues In Macintyre’s Social Practices”
In
After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre is explicit in describing the internal
goods of a practice as qualities that constitute the specific excellences
inherent in the practice, which the practitioners of that coherent and
complex form of social activity may acquire through immersion in that
practice. But what kind of “goods” are these internal goods
of a practice? Are they distinctively moral goods? Or are
they simply technical goods, which may lead to proficiency in the conduct
of the practice? MacIntyre’s examples of internal goods, such
as the goods acquired through learning to play chess, leave these questions,
and their possible answers, ambiguous. It is possible to construe
MacIntyre’s account of internal goods as suggesting that their acquisition
by the practitioner produces a fundamental competence in the completion
of the tasks associated with the practice. But is competence an
internal good? Is a competence a moral good? MacIntyre does
not offer a response to this issue. In this paper, I will argue
that MacIntyre’s overall project may affirm the proposal that the
goods internal to a practice comprise both moral goods and goods of
competent performance. Further, I will attempt to show that MacIntyre’s
description of the role virtues play in the achievement of internal
goods may also be understood as related to both moral goods and goods
of competence. Finally, I will use a pair of contemporary professional
communities of practice as examples of the way virtues and internal
goods may interact.
Richard Poirier, Universal Music Group, Los Angeles
“The Presidential Candidates – Agents of Change or ‘Partners’ in maintaining the Status Quo?”
MacIntyre
famously ends After Virtue by drawing qualified parallels between the
conditions shortly before the Roman Empire’s decline into the Dark
Ages and conditions facing our own age in Europe and North America.
One parallel is that people of good-will reach a turning point when
they no longer believe that those in government possess civility and
moral integrity __ virtues that communities value. One difference he
points out is that Rome’s adversarial barbarians were “waiting beyond
the frontiers,” whereas the barbarians of today “have been governing
us for quite some time.” (AV p. 263) This notion that we are governed
by barbarians provides a new frame of reference in evaluating the two
major party candidates currently running for president of the United
States. This paper will examine five questions. First, are those in
political power maintaining a great public illusion that we have a representative
government that protects and promotes our interests, when their only
real agenda is to maintain this illusion to protect and promote the
interests of the ruling elite? Second, are opposing political candidates
actually ‘partners’ - each needing the other as a target - in framing
the ideological debate to limit public discussion of vital issues, thus
maintaining the status quo as MacIntyre maintains? Third, are elections
for real? In other words, do we really have real choices in elections
such as voting for none of the above or whether we agree to be bound
by the laws passed in our name? Fourth, do candidates really support
a neutral state, a pluralistic society and the necessary environment
for individuals to pursue the good life? Fifth, has either candidate
articulated what constitutes ‘the good’ and is there any chance
that, if promoted properly, such a view could reach a consensus?
Gregory S. Poore, Baylor University,
“Community, Human Nature, and the Care of the Severely Disabled: A Critique of MacIntyre’s Account,”
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntrye attempts to provide a social account of the human good and virtues in terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative unity of life. This represents an attempt to salvage an Aristotelian account of the virtues while rejecting the metaphysical biology which its teleology presupposes. MacIntyre later recognized the need to base an account of the human good and virtues on human nature. In Rational Dependent Animals, he attempts to ground the virtues in a biological account of humans and to answer the difficult question of why we should care for the severely disabled. This paper argues that MacIntyre’s account is inadequate.
MacIntyre’s
difficulty begins with the fact that his communities of practice do
not naturally include the severely disabled within their membership.
In response to this difficulty, he provides four reasons why we should
care for the severely disabled. I argue that three of these reasons—we
owe them care because of what we have received, we could have been them,
and we may learn something very valuable from their care—are inadequate.
MacIntyre’s understanding of roles, which is his fourth reason, does
show the way for an adequate account of why we should care for the severely
disabled, but I argue that it is ultimately incomplete. In particular,
MacIntyre’s biological account of human nature is unable to ground
adequately some key virtues when they extend beyond familial relations.
I conclude that if an adequate theoretical account of why we should
care for the severely disabled is to be provided, then a metaphysical
and not merely biological account of human nature is needed.
Margaret Rankin, Gonzaga University,
“Music as MacIntyrean Practice in the Christian Community”
Alastair
MacIntyre has said that a practice can be understood as “any coherent
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity,
with the result that…human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended.” (After Virtue, 1st edition, pg. 175)
This can apply to a variety of cultures and one commonly asked question
is how the concept of practice, if indeed retained, could be revealed
in concrete examples for contemporary society. In this paper, I propose
that music, particularly vocal or sung music, in the Christian community
is an example of societal practice in MacIntyre’s terms. It is a practice
within a practice (that of liturgical worship), which is normative (it
centers such a society around the event of singing scripture or statements
of belief, both of which set standards for the community) and also teleological
(it operates with a specific function and with a specific goal, that
of worshipping and drawing closer to God, in sight). This, of course,
is not only true of a Christian society (almost all cultures hold some
form of vocal music, especially chant, as a basic component of their
early formation), however in the interest of time and space I see it
necessary to confine this paper to the area of the Christian society.
Michael Robertson, Muskegon Community College,
“Republicanism and the Eudaimonic Economy,”
I take for granted that the U.S. is a wealthy post-industrial society, that we (that is, we Americans) owe our wealth largely to technological development, that we can expect technological development and concomitant economic growth to continue, and that to distribute and dispose of that wealth we have developed a consumer economy, along with a massive military-industrial complex and a burgeoning financial sector whose speculative activity is only tenuously based on economic reality. Our current patterns of distribution and consumption, particularly those that have developed over the past thirty years, are implicated in serious threats to the environment, to our national security, and especially to our social and political institutions. I shall focus on the threat to our political institutions.
Seen through the lens of Aristotelian practical philosophy, our polity is degenerating from a republic into an oligarchy. During the past thirty years, several trends have emerged that tend towards the concentration of wealth and power and the weakening of checks on that power.
Applying the lessons of the Aristotelian tradition can halt this degeneration. The Aristotelian ideals of eudaimonia and civic virtue supply a rationale for a program of reform that would reverse these oligarchic trends by massively redirecting our aggregate wealth toward education and research. This “eudaimonic” economy would divert wealth from the consumer economy, the military-industrial complex, and the financial sector and invest it in our human capital. Universal postsecondary education is a feasible first step in this direction.
Liberalism
provides no consistent rationale for such a program; indeed, liberals
might consistently oppose it. Since the redirection of resources
would most likely require governmental direction, Rawlsian liberals
might object that this de facto endorsement of Aristotelian ideals would
constitute an unacceptable departure from official neutrality concerning
"questions of ultimate concern". Neoliberals and neoconservatives
would object to the subordination of the free market and the expansion
of government. Finally, the moderate individualism of the Aristotelian
tradition is at odds with both the extreme atomistic individualism of
classical liberalism and the collectivism of post-modernism. It
may therefore be necessary depart from liberal principles in order to
move towards a eudaimonic economy.
Gregory B. Sadler, Fayetteville State University,
"Psychotherapy and Psychoanalytic Theory in Relation to MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics"
Psychological
and therapeutic theories receive mixed evaluations in MacIntyre’s
works. On the one hand, he provides negative evaluations of extension
of assumptions of various types of psychological theory and therapy
into the wider realm of moral discourse and practice. On the other hand,
he has drawn upon and incorporated into his own thought valuable insights
from certain psychoanalytic practitioners and theorists, e.g. Winnicot
in Dependent Rational Animals, or Lacan in his 2005 Erasmus Institute
Seminar. My paper will discuss these positive and negative evaluations,
and then discuss in particular insights about ethics provided by Jacques
Lacan, able to be critically incorporated within a MacIntyrian framework.
Jonathan Sands-Wise, Georgetown College,
"Making a Necessity of Virtue"
What does MacIntyre mean by subtitling
Dependent Rational Animals, "Why Human Beings Need the Virtues?"
I explore MacIntyre's employment of the thesis that virtue is necessary
for happiness and his use of it in defining virtues. While cultural
relativism undercuts the necessity thesis, I argue that a properly chastened
necessity thesis accomplishes all that a MacIntyrean project requires.
Finally, I discuss some of the many implications of the chastened necessity
thesis, including the continuing crucial role for tradition as communities
embrace their particularities, and the need for continual re-exploration
of our biological and social lives, along with a willingness to revise
our lists of virtues in light of these explorations.
Benjamin Smith, Aquinas College,
“Political Community and Moral Inquiry: Thomas Aquinas and Alasdair MacIntyre,”
The
most important debate in contemporary political philosophy revolves
around the question of whether political communities should be neutral
with respect to competing substantive commitments. Alasdair MacIntyre,
Michael Sandel, and others have argued that political neutrality regarding
substantive commitments is both illusory and based on an inadequate
understanding of the connection between person and community. Relying
on MacIntyre’s account of moral inquiry and Thomas’s understanding
of political life, law, and tradition, this paper demonstrates that
there is an essential connection between successful moral inquiry and
substantive political order, namely, the political community has an
essential role in facilitating successful moral inquiry. This is important,
because it provide good reasons for political communities to embrace
substantive commitments and reject the putative moral neutrality of
liberalism.
Albert D. Spalding, Jr., Wayne State University,
“Flourishing in the Midst of Dread: A Postmodern Thomism,”
Abstract was PDF
J. Michael Tilley, Georgetown College,
“MacIntyre and Kierkegaard on Narrative, Life-View, and Conversion “
MacIntyre’s
treatment of Kierkegaard in After Virtue has sparked a considerable
amount of discussion particularly concerning Kierkegaard’s conception
of the role of reason in the progression through the stages of existence.
Most of this discussion has been a defense of the claim, contra MacIntyre,
that the transition from one stage to the next is not accomplished by
means of an “irrational leap.” In this paper, I will briefly outline
MacIntyre’s criticism of the ethical views presented in Either/Or.
I will then describe the “Kierkegaardian response” to MacIntyre’s
criticism. It turns out that MacIntyre’s response to his critics involves
a great number of concessions about the limited scope and one-sidedness
of his original view, but he still maintains the substance of his original
view. MacIntyre’s narrative account of selfhood shows how individuals
can render their own actions rational and intelligible, but since, as
MacIntyre maintains, the aesthete will reject all the arguments and
reasons advanced in defense of the ethical, it is impossible for a there
to be a genuine intelligible narrative that connects the aesthetic and
the religious from a Kierkegaardian standpoint. My argument will show
that MacIntyre’s response fails to show that the transition from the
aesthetic to the ethical is based merely on a groundless choice, but
rather on a rational life-view conversion. There are two major implications
to this argument: (1) the idea of a rational life-view conversion speaks
to issues at the heart of MacIntyre’s project of grounding ethical
and political action in traditions without reducing one’s view to
a sort of relativism. (2) It shows that the question of whether one
can understand Kierkegaard’s theory of selfhood as a narrative theory
remains an open question.
Rose Tondra
“Theory, Practice and Tradition,”
This paper uses Dr. MacIntyre's studies of schools of moral reasoning in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry to 1. contrast two traditional ways of Christian moral reasoning with others systems, old and new; 2. describe a current example of one pastoral library's approach to Catholic reasoning toward the good life; and 3. show the distinctiveness and 4. the benefits of this Catholic approach.
The
main idea is that the practice of our religion promotes a broad, authentic
rationality because it recognizes the Redemptive works of the Lord and
their effects, and leads to good lives. The categories of the pastoral
library indicate method as well as content. They demonstrate continuity
and development in our moral reasoning. Natural law makes this a shareable
rationality which can benefit everyone.
Katinka Waelbers, Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Netherlands
Poster: "Human Practices, the Good
Life and Technologies,"
Peyton E. Wofford, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University
“Aristotle Rehabilitated: Alasdair MacIntyre’s New Interpretation of Aristotle in Some of His Recent Work”
In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre
extends his famous critique of modernity to offer a social remedy for
its crisis. MacIntyre’s new philosophy, which I term rehabilitation,
adopts Aristotle’s telos, while emphasizing our dependent relationships,
the virtues of acknowledged dependence cultivated therein, and the necessity
of a balance between these and Aristotle’s independent virtues for
the pursuit of our telos. MacIntyre critiques Aristotle’s denigration
of human dependence, but refuses to discard entirely Aristotle’s framework,
teleological focus and belief in nature’s normative value. In
Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre achieves the elusive balance between
rejection and acceptance of the ancients, making the integration of
Aristotle’s teleological justification for morality into modernity
more plausible.
Panel Discussion: MacIntyrean
Empirics
Ron Beadle, Northumbria University, UK
Samantha Coe, Northumbria University, UK
Carter Crockett, Westmont College, California, USA
Geoff Moore, Durham University,
England)
To
coincide with the publication of a Special Edition of Philosophy of
Management on MacIntyrean empirics, this workshop (lasting 90 minutes)
will consider how to undertake empirical work using MacIntyre’s goods-virtues-practice-
In the first part of the workshop the panellists will briefly introduce empirical projects in the pharmaceutical and oil and gas industries and in the contexts of a music facility the traditional circus and a church based project on ecumenism. These have involved the use of diverse methods.
In the second part, a facilitated discussion will involve delegates working in groups around the following questions:
- What is the purpose of doing empirical work using MacInytre’s framework?
- In which sorts of contexts could empirical work be undertaken?
- In which sorts of contexts should empirical work be undertaken?
- What methods are available to us and what are their relative strengths and weaknesses?
- Do we need to translate MacIntyre’s concepts when working with practitioners?
- What is the effect of the researcher on the researched – does this vary with method?
Panel Discussion: Labor
and Unionization
PANELISTS:
Neil Davison
Milton Fisk
Jeff Nicholas
This panel initiated out of the concerns arising from an attempt at pre-union organization at a Benedictine Monastery where the administration opposed the organization of employees. The rise of neo-conservativism, the decline of the economy, and the continuing decline of jobs give the panel a needed practical import.
In the first part of the session, panelists will each provide a brief discussion of their own experiences with labor unions and their primary perspectives in addressing the question of labor unions. It will also address the neo-liberal project and the defeat of the labor union movement.
The second part of the panel will discuss and attempt to answer the following questions:
1. What basis in MacIntyrean philosophy is there for the development and support of labor unions?
2. Might MacIntyre's earlier positions (i.e. pre-c. 1971) have more to say on these issues than his more recent work?
3. What does Catholic Social Teaching have to say about labor unions?
4. What are the challenges labor unions face today?
5. Do labor unions still have the power or ability to protect workers?
6. how can a minority non-bargaining union be effective?
7. Can unions be democratic and what evidence of this can be found?
8. Can we replace business unionism with movement unionism?
New and Noteworthy
Publications
The usual suspects.